Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger

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Abstract: This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she has done. This function allows us to explore the moral status of forgiveness, including why forgiveness is typically elective.

Keywords: anger, communication, forgiveness, moral theory, sanction

Forgiveness is a diverse phenomenon. Sometimes it has to do with forgetting or wiping away a transgression (Allais 2008; Rye et al. 2001). Other times it is a matter of forbearing punishment or cancelling a moral debt (Twambley 1976; Warmke 2013, 2016a). And still other times it is connected to seeking reconciliation (Card 2004; Pettigrove 2012, 12–17; Quinn 2004, 222; Roberts 1995, 299). Finally, as a number of scholars have noted, forgiving a person is sometimes about overcoming, letting go of, or forswearing our anger with her for what she has done.¹

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forswearing anger. On our view, forswearing anger is the commitment to leave behind one’s angry feelings as much as possible and to refrain from expressing or acting on them to the degree that they remain or if they recur. This commitment may take the form of an outward speech act (read Pettigrove 2004; Warmke 2016b). But it can also remain a purely internal decision—something that happens in our hearts (M. M. Adams 1991, 294)—as is often the case with forgiving the dead. Importantly, we do not regard this account as a comprehensive definition; we do not take it to cover all aspects of every case we might intuitively categorize as forgiveness. Indeed, following a number of scholars (Neblett 1974, 273; Smith 2013, 134; Warmke and McKenna 2013, 189–201), we are skeptical that an all-encompassing definition could ever be provided. Still, the idea of forswearing anger captures a central part of a large number of cases of forgiveness and thus merits philosophical scrutiny.

Insofar as forgiveness is a matter of forswearing anger, understanding forgiveness requires a clear view of anger. Now there are several ways to think about anger. On a folk level, anger is often seen as an expansive phenomenon. It is taken to pick out a general kind of emotional upset we feel in response to anything that causes something to happen that we dislike. As such, it can be directed towards not only people but also objects (such as stalled cars) and situations (such as bad weather). We wish to set aside this broad use of the word. For we care about the kind of anger that is relevant to the act of forgiveness, and we do not typically conceive of ourselves as forgiving our cars for not starting or the rain for ruining our picnic (Averill 1982, 166; Hughes 1993). Thus, when we speak of anger, we will have its narrower, moral sense in mind.

Our starting point here is P. F. Strawson’s (1962) claim that moral anger is a reactive attitude. Reactive attitudes are emotional responses to interpersonal situations. These emotional responses are constituted in part by a characteristic appraisal of the situation. There are disagreements about how exactly to interpret the appraisal at stake in the case of moral anger. But in what follows we will embrace the view defended by Zac Cogley (2013a, 2013b). According to his view, the appraisal at the heart of moral anger is of some person (the wrongdoer) as doing wrong out of ill will toward or insufficient moral concern for another person (the victim).

Some accounts of forgiveness, such as those forwarded by Lucy Allais (2008) and Pamela Hieronymi (2001), focus primarily on this appraisal function of moral anger. We think that this approach represents one useful paradigm for thinking about forgiveness, and we do not wish to reject it or even level serious objections against it. Instead, we wish to propose an alternative paradigm that also has significant
explanatory power. What will set our approach apart is that we will look beyond the appraisal function of moral anger. We will take into account the fact that moral anger also has two other important functions. First, it has a communicative function: it often conveys to the wrongdoer that his action was morally wrong (Keltner and Haidt 1999; Macnamara 2013a; Parkinson 1996; Van Kleef 2009). Second, moral anger has a sanctioning function: it often sanctions or punishes the wrongdoer for what he did (Cogley 2013b; Nussbaum 2016, 14–56). To be clear, by highlighting these three functions—appraising, communicating, and sanctioning—we are not presenting an account of the essence of moral anger. It is not our view that all and only cases of moral anger possess these three features. Rather, what we maintain is that appraising, communicating, and sanctioning are central characteristics of many cases of moral anger. And we believe that taking all three functions into account can help explain the inner workings of many cases of forgiveness.

In sum, our goal in this paper is to develop the idea that anger often has more than just an appraisal function and to use this idea to shed light on one important kind of forgiveness. In so doing, we will contribute to the literature on emotion by revealing some of the explanatory payoffs to be gained in the moral realm when we look beyond the appraisal function of anger. In addition, we will contribute to the literature on forgiveness by solving some notorious puzzles concerning forgiveness that can be hard to handle if we restrict ourselves to talking about the appraisal function of moral anger.

To accomplish these goals, we will begin by describing two classic philosophical challenges facing all accounts of forgiveness—one having to do with distinguishing forgiveness from related phenomena and the other having to do with the rationality of forgiveness. We will then explain how appealing to the communicative function of anger provides a satisfying response to these challenges. We will also lay out the details of the sanctioning function of anger. Finally, we will use our account of anger’s sanctioning function to address a well-known puzzle about the moral status of forgiveness, namely the fact that it is typically elective but can sometimes be either morally required or morally forbidden.  

**TWO PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES FACING ACCOUNTS OF FORGIVENESS**

Accounts of forgiveness face two well-known challenges. The first challenge, raised by Jeffrie Murphy (1990a, 20; 2004, 13–14) and developed by others (Allais 2008, 34–36; Griswold 2007, 47; Hampton 1990, 84n; Hieronymi 2001, 529–30; Hughes and
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Warmke 2017; Pettigrove 2007), has to do with distinguishing forgiveness from other things that resemble it and are sometimes confused with it. The source of the trouble here is that there are different kinds of reasons why we foreshow our anger with people, and some of these reasons are constitutive of either excusing or justifying a person’s action rather than forgiving it.

Examples illustrate the point. First, suppose I think my friend wrongs me during a night out together at a local bar by drinking all my beer. As a result, I get angry and think, “What she did was wrong!” After a moment of reflection, however, I change my mind. What she did was not wrong after all. For it was not my beer she drank. She was drinking her own beer—I had just gotten confused. In response to recognizing these facts, I forswear my anger.

Or, take a different version of the same example. Suppose my friend actually does drink all my beer. I am not confused or mistaken; the beer really was mine. So, I once again become angry with her and think, “What she did was wrong!” Yet, upon consideration, I decide my friend was not responsible for her misdeed because she did not know it was my beer she was drinking. It looked like hers, and the glasses had been switched around on the table. The whole thing was just an accident or a mistake, and so I disavow my anger.

What is important about these cases is that neither one of them describes an instance of forgiveness. Renouncing my anger with my friend because I have decided she did nothing morally wrong, as in the first example, is to see her action as justified. Forswearing my anger with her because I have determined she was not morally responsible for her misdeed, as in the second example, is to excuse her. Yet, as Murphy (2004, 13) points out, justifying and excusing are not forgiving; they are ways of recognizing that “there is nothing here to forgive.” Put differently, justifying and excusing are ways of discovering that the situation did not warrant anger in the first place. In both cases, it is easy to understand why a reasonable person would decide to leave behind their anger: anger’s appraisal was not accurate.

Forgiveness is different. It requires something more than simply forswearing anger. It requires forswearing anger while continuing to think that the person’s action was wrongly and culpably done. In other words, it requires forswearing anger while continuing to hold on to the appraisal at the heart of anger. As Jean Hampton (1990, 84n) puts it, “forgiveness, like a pardon, presupposes guilt.”

Yet, this lesson leads to a second challenge, one most famously raised by Aurel Kolnai (1974, 95–99): Why would it ever make sense to do that? Why would it ever be reasonable to commit to abandoning our anger when we still think that the person
morally wronged us and is without an excuse? What reasons could we have for forsaking our anger if the appraisal at the heart of our anger is accurate—that is, it reflects the facts? If the original offense still subsists, Kolnai (1974, 98) says, by renouncing our anger, are we not just acquiescing to it or condoning it?

There are at least two ways to address Kolnai's challenge. One way is to focus on the appraisal at the heart of anger. The strategy here involves claiming that anger's appraisal is more complicated than meets the eye. Being angry with someone involves more than just viewing his action as wrongly and culpably done. It includes some additional thought or judgment as well. For instance, as Hieronymi (2001, 546) develops the view, anger also may involve interpreting the person's wrongful action as a threat—that is, as "say[ing], in effect, that you can be treated in this way, and that such treatment is acceptable." Or, on Allais's version of the view, anger also may involve regarding the person as bad or rotten because of his misdeed. In her own words, it may involve "seeing her differently, as 'lowered,' as a result of her wrongdoing" or "in a more negative way, corresponding to her specific wrongdoing" (Allais 2008, 56, 59; read also Hampton 1990, 83–85; Holmgren 2012, 100).

On this first way of addressing Kolnai's challenge, forgiveness makes sense when you continue to think that the person's action was morally wrong but you change your mind about one of these additional thoughts. For Hieronymi (2001, 545–52), this means you disavow your anger because you determine that the person's action, although wrong, is no longer a threat. For Allais (2013, 56–59), it means you reject your anger because you decide the person's moral character is not diminished by the wrong he has done. To summarize, forgiveness is rational on this first way of addressing Kolnai's challenge insofar as you judge that the appraisal that stands at the heart of your anger is no longer fully accurate. The assessment of the wrongdoer as guilty remains, but the additional judgment(s) justifying your anger have fallen away.

There is something to this first line of response to Kolnai's challenge, and we will return to it later. Right now, however, we wish to point out that there is a second way to handle the challenge. Instead of focusing on the appraisal at the heart of anger, it is possible to focus on the fact that anger is not just an appraisal. It has additional functions besides construing another person's behavior in a specific way. As we noted at the beginning of the paper, it also involves communicating to the person that what he did was wrong and sanctioning or punishing him for what he has done.

On this second way of addressing Kolnai's challenge, forgiveness makes sense or is rational when you continue to think that the person's action was wrong, but
you determine that one of these additional functions is no longer appropriate. For example, you forego your anger because it becomes apparent that continuing to communicate anger’s message no longer makes sense. Or, you disavow your anger because you recognize that continuing to punish the person for his action is no longer justified. In what follows, we will develop the details of this second response.8

THE COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION OF ANGER

People do not always express their anger outwardly. And, when they do express it outwardly, they tend to do so in different ways (Averill 1983, 1147). Nevertheless, many episodes of anger show characteristic facial, vocal, and bodily responses. A person may point toward the target, stretch out frontally, and move laterally (Wallbott 1998). Certain speech patterns are also representative of anger (Scherer 1986; Scherer et al. 1991) and it has commonly-recognized facial expressions (Ekman 1999). We do not mean here to commit to the thesis that anger is cross-culturally or universally recognizable by specific outward expressions. As James A. Russell’s (1994) work suggests, this may go too far. Still, there do seem to be common associations between inner states and outward appearances. And these associations are strong enough to enable us with some reliability to let others know when we are angry.

This raises an obvious question. Why is it important to let others know about our anger? What is the point of this behavior? Following Gerben Van Kleef (2009; 2012), we think the answer to this question has to do with the fact that anger has a social function and, more specifically, a communicative function (read also Averill 1982, 3–32; Cogley 2013a, 2013b; Keltner and Haidt 1999; Macnamara 2013a; Parkinson 1996; Strawson 1962, 21–22). The communicative function or goal of anger is to convey to someone that she has done something wrong. More precisely, it is to get the wrongdoer to feel guilty or remorseful because she has wronged us out of ill will or insufficient concern (Baumeister et al. 2007, 189). By guilt or remorse, we have in mind what Marilyn Frye (1983, 88) and Nancy Potter (2000, 480–83) describe as the emotional uptake of the appraisal at the heart of anger. Such emotional uptake includes devoting attention to the appraisal, taking it seriously, trying to understand it from the victim’s point of view, and appropriately modifying their behavior going forward.9

For example, consider a victim who is angry with someone because she cuts him off on the bike path, causing him to fall. His anger at her—whether expressed by finger-pointing, a verbal outburst, or in some other way—aims in part to get her to
see herself as having acted wrongly, to feel guilty about it, and not to do it again in the future.

There are several reasons one might hesitate to attribute this communicative function to anger. As noted before, anger often goes unexpressed, in which case it cannot elicit guilt. In addition, anger is not always successful at eliciting guilt. Nor is it always intended to do so. To return to the bike example, the person who has fallen down may not say or do anything but rather inwardly stew in his resentment. Or, he may scream at the top of his lungs only to have his assailant laugh at him in return.

Thus, we are not claiming that every instance of anger successfully communicates in the way described above. Nor are we saying it is always intended to do so. Our view is that anger, like many other psychological processes, has what Peter McLaughlin (2000, 11–12) calls nonintentional purposiveness. More colloquially, anger has functions apart from the intentions of the person feeling it—that is, regardless of whether the functions are intended by the person experiencing it.

Function and intention often come apart like this (McLaughlin 2000, 42–62). We intentionally use hammers to prop open doors even though that is not one of their functions. Conversely, ornate dinnerware has the function of holding and serving food and beverages even though we do not always use it for that purpose, preferring instead to enjoy it as decorative art. To use a biological example, we intentionally use our noses to hold up our glasses, but supporting glasses is not the function of our noses. Conversely, long-distance running is one of the functions of human legs even though many of us never put them to such use.

We adopt the etiological theory of function ascription to explain these facts (read Macnamara 2013a, 8–9; McLaughlin 2000, 118–38). On the etiological theory, something is a function of an item just in case (1) that function is an effect of past items of that type and (2) this fact about the items in part explains the current existence of items of that type. Holding and serving food and beverages is one of the functions of ornate dinnerware because ornate dinnerware of the past held and served food and beverages, and that is partly why it is still around. Similarly, running long distances is one of the functions of human legs because the legs of earlier humans enabled them to travel long distances and that is one reason why we have these sorts of legs today.

We can apply the etiological theory to anger as follows. Eliciting guilt (i.e., the emotional uptake of anger’s appraisal) meets the two etiological conditions for being a function of anger (Macnamara 2013a, 8–9). Past instances of anger had the effect of eliciting guilt or remorse in their target, and those past effects are among the reasons anger exists today (Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa 2010). This effect is
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communicative: it serves to convey to the wrongdoer that the victim has appraised her action as wrongful and wants the wrongdoer to uptake that assessment.\textsuperscript{12}

The Felicity Conditions of Anger

It is common to say that anger has more than one communicative function. Indeed, several theorists identify two distinct communicative acts involved in moral anger (Hieronymi 2001, 530; Holmgren 2012, 31–32; Macnamara 2013b; Strawson 1962, 21–22). First, anger involves an assertion: it asserts that what the person did was morally wrong. In other words, it aims to get the target to believe that she has shown ill will or insufficient concern in her wrongful conduct. Second, anger involves a demand. In particular, it demands that the person feel guilty for her wrongful conduct (i.e., give uptake of anger’s appraisal), as demonstrated by an apology, modified behavior, and the like (Potter 2000, 480).

Acts that have communicative functions have felicity conditions. Felicity conditions are the conditions under which a communicative act is reasonably performed (read Austin 1975; Searle 1969). Since anger involves both an assertion and a demand, it inherits the felicity conditions for both acts. On John Searle's (1969, 66) canonical account, assertions and demands possess a variety of felicity conditions. We will focus on the ones that are directly relevant to the kind of forgiveness we are discussing. To wit, it must not be obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer already believes what is being asserted or has already done what is being demanded. In other words, if both parties appreciate that the hearer already knows \(p\), then it is infelicitous for the speaker to continue to assert \(p\). Similarly, if both parties appreciate that the hearer has already done \(a\), then it is infelicitous for the speaker to demand that the hearer do \(a\).

Examples help. Suppose I tell my friend Michelle that Elizabeth Warren will run for President in 2020. But Michelle responds that she already knows this. In fact, she is volunteering for Warren's campaign. In this situation, my assertion about Warren is gratuitous. So, there is no reason to continue with it. Similarly, suppose I demand that my roommate turn in her half of the rent for the month. But she says that she has already put her rent check on my desk. In this scenario, it does not make sense for me to continue to demand that she produce the check. Such a demand is out of place because she has already done what is being demanded of her.

These lessons apply to anger. We noted before that being angry often involves the assertion that what the person did was wrong—for example, that her drinking my beer is wrong. But if she readily admits that it was wrong to drink my beer, then it
does not make sense for me to continue asserting this point by way of my anger. My assertion’s aim has already been achieved and so keeping at it would be gratuitous. Similarly, we said above that anger often involves the demand that the person feel guilty for what she has done—for instance, for drinking all of my beer. But suppose she already feels guilty. Indeed, suppose she has demonstrated emotional uptake by discussing the matter with me, empathizing with my point of view, apologizing for her transgression, and ceasing to drink my beer any more. In such a case, it is not appropriate to continue demanding that she give uptake. The goal of my demand has already been met (read McGeer 2013, 174–75).

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To review, the kind of forgiveness that interests us in this paper involves forswearing one's anger with a person for a wrong he has done out of ill will or insufficient concern. Yet forgiveness is not just any kind of disavowing anger. For there are ways of rejecting anger that do not count as forgiveness but rather as either excusing or justifying. Thus we hold that forgiveness of the sort under discussion involves forswearing our anger with a person while continuing to believe that what he did was wrong. The puzzle raised by Kolnai is why it might make sense to do this—why it might be reasonable to forswear our anger even though we still think the person has wronged us.

We can now explain our answer to Kolnai’s puzzle. We believe it is reasonable to forgive when the communicative functions of moral anger cease to be appropriate. And the communicative functions of moral anger cease to be appropriate when their felicity conditions no longer obtain: it is obvious that the wrongdoer already believes that he has done wrong and already feels guilty about it. Now a wrongdoer may convey to the victim that these conditions no longer obtain in a variety of ways. But one primary way is by issuing a sincere apology and modifying his behavior. When this happens, we say that the victim has a reason to forgive because the communicative goals of her anger are satisfied. It no longer makes sense to try to get the wrongdoer to believe he has done something wrong and to feel guilty for doing it because he has already done both.

Allais’s View of Forgiveness

In Section 3, we noted that there are other ways to handle the philosophical challenges facing accounts of forgiveness. One popular alternative to our approach is to focus solely on anger's appraisal. In particular, some scholars proceed by
expanding the propositional content of anger’s appraisal (Allais 2008; Hampton 1990, 83–85; Hieronymi 2001; Holmgren 2012, 100; Zaragoza 2012). In addition to seeing the wrongdoer’s action as morally wrong and culpably done, they claim that the person feeling anger makes some further judgment. Forgiveness then becomes reasonable when the angry person changes his mind about the correctness of this further judgment.

There are several proposals for the additional judgment. While we will not canvas all of them, we will consider a representative one, namely Allais’s (2008) proposal that the person who is angry also sees the target of her anger as bad or corrupt. According to Allais, the angry person makes a compound judgment. Not only does she (1) view the wrongdoer’s action as morally wrong and culpably done, but she also (2) views him, as a person, to be morally compromised as a result (Allais 2008, 56–59, 62). In other words, she sees the wrongdoer as having diminished moral worth on account of having committed some wrongful act. One advantage of this view is that it offers Allais a way of overcoming the first challenge facing accounts of forgiveness. She has no trouble distinguishing between forgiving, on the one hand, and either justifying or excusing on the other hand. On her account, a victim justifies or excuses a wrongdoer if she changes her mind regarding judgment (1) and no longer considers the wrongdoer’s action morally wrong or culpably done. A victim forgives a wrongdoer, by contrast, if she holds fast to judgment (1) but changes her mind regarding judgment (2). That is to say, she holds fixed her view of the wrongdoer’s action but undergoes a change of heart regarding the wrongdoer himself. She ceases to consider his moral worth to be compromised on account of his action (Allais 2008, 57, 62). To use Augustine’s famous turn of phrase, forgiveness on Allais’s view involves separating the “sin” from the “sinner” and no longer taking a dim view of the latter because of the former.

What Our View of Forgiveness Adds

The appeal of Allais’s strategy is that it can handle the first challenge facing accounts of forgiveness. But it faces a difficulty when it comes to the second challenge, the one raised by Kolnai. To wit, although it can explain why forgiveness in the sense of forsaking anger is rational in many cases, there are some cases where it cannot do so. For, according to Allais, we have a reason to forgive only if we have a reason to revise our negative judgment about the moral standing of the wrongdoer. In particular, we must have a reason to think the wrongdoer’s moral worth is not compromised on account of his action (read Allais 2008, 59–63). This explanation presupposes that
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we initially thought the wrongdoer’s moral worth was compromised. In Allais’s (2008, 56) words, it presupposes that our anger involved “seeing [the wrongdoer] differently, as ‘lowered’, as a result of her wrongdoing.” Many cases of anger may be like this. But not all of them. And it is the cases that deviate from this norm that Allais cannot accommodate.

We do not think this problem warrants rejecting Allais’s approach. As we said at the outset, we doubt that there is a single account of forgiveness that can handle all aspects of all cases. Instead, we bring up the problem because it allows us to highlight one respect in which our paradigm is more helpful. It can handle some important cases that create difficulties for Allais’s paradigm.

Perhaps the clearest examples of the kind of cases we have in mind have to do with loved ones we hold in high esteem who commit minor offenses against us. Susan Wolf (2011) discusses several such examples in “Blame, Italian Style.” Wolf describes her family as being close-knit and deeply caring. Yet, from time to time, there are events that lead to “slammed doors and raised voices or . . . dirty looks and tight jaws” (2011, 334). For instance, she relates how her daughter repeatedly raids her closet to borrow clothes and shoes without first asking for permission (2011, 334). She also recounts how her husband has a tendency to tell her that he is ready to go—only to make her wait while he finds his glasses, washes his coffee cup, or gathers his books (2011, 334). Wolf finds herself getting angry about these things and blaming her family members for what they have done. Yet, she claims that her anger does not involve lowering her estimation of her daughter’s or husband’s character. The reason is that the actions in question are minor missteps. They are not indicative of any robust pattern of vice. If they reveal anything, Wolf says, it is that her daughter and husband are imperfectly virtuous (2011, 337–38). Although generally respectful, they commit small acts of inconsiderateness from time to time, as all people do. Since Wolf never took her family members to be perfectly virtuous, their transgressions are not new data that require her to lower her estimation of their moral standing.

It follows that Wolf cannot forgive her daughter or her husband for the reasons Allais describes. She cannot forswear her anger with them on the grounds that she no longer sees them as bad or corrupt for what they have done. For their actions did not lead her to see them as bad or corrupt in the first place. In particular, Wolf cannot cease to consider her daughter’s moral worth to be compromised on account of stealing her clothes because Wolf never took these “thefts” to be indicative of some great deficiency in her daughter. Similarly, she cannot cease to take a dim view
of her husband on account of the fact that he sometimes keeps her waiting because his occasional tardiness never led her to take a dim view of him.

One virtue of the approach to forgiveness we are forwarding in this paper is that it is able to handle Wolf’s cases. As we see it, Wolf’s anger at her daughter and her husband serves a communicative function. It lets them know that she thinks what they did was wrong, and it asks them to own up to their mistakes. These communicative goals make sense. Even if her daughter’s misstep was minor and not revelatory of a deeper vice, it is reasonable for Wolf to want her daughter to acknowledge that it was indeed a misstep. Even if her husband’s inconsiderateness did not impair their marital relationship, it is reasonable for Wolf to want him to acknowledge the frustration it caused. On our view, Wolf has a reason to forgive her family members once these communicative goals have been satisfied. In other words, she has a reason to forswear her moral anger with her husband and daughter once they have felt a fitting amount of guilt and apologized.

THE SANCTIONING FUNCTION OF ANGER

Our central claim in this paper is that it is possible to shed light on the nature of one important kind of forgiveness by appealing to the various functions of anger. Up to this point, we have been focusing on conceptual issues, such Murphy’s question about how to distinguish forgiveness from related phenomena and Kolnai’s famous challenge. We now wish to slightly shift directions. In the remaining sections of the paper, we will discuss how our functional account of anger can shed light on the moral status of forgiveness. In particular, we will use our view of anger to explain how—depending on the situation—forgiveness can be forbidden, required, or elective.

Turning to the moral status of forgiveness will require looking beyond the communicative function of anger to the sanctioning function of anger. To see why, we can return to one of Wolf’s examples. Suppose Wolf angrily confronts her daughter for stealing clothes from her closet, thereby trying to get her daughter to feel guilty for her wrongdoing. It quickly becomes apparent that her daughter does feel guilty; she even issues a sincere apology to demonstrate her guilt. Yet, imagine that Wolf refuses to disavow her anger with her daughter. Because the communicative goal of her anger has been satisfied, continuing to be angry is infelicitous—being angry with her daughter no longer makes good communicative sense. But is there anything morally wrong with Wolf’s holding on to it? Is she morally required to forgive her daughter after she has repented of her misdeed?
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To answer these questions, we do not need to advance a full account of what makes conduct morally wrong. For our purposes, it is enough to assert as a placeholder that wrongful conduct typically affects the other party negatively in some way, for example by hurting her or frustrating her interests. Our view is that anger typically affects the target in this way. It negatively affects people psychologically and emotionally. This is why it makes sense to say some instances of anger are morally wrong.

We can explicate this fact by appealing to what we will call the sanctioning function of anger. The sanctioning function of anger is to impose unwanted costs on the wrongdoer aimed at expressing condemnation of his wrongful conduct (Allais 2008, 48; Cogley 2013a, 2013b). These costs are imposed in three main ways. First, anger often produces guilt in the target, which is inherently painful. Second, the characteristic bodily expressions of anger (facial expressions, gestures, postures, etc.) are inherently unpleasant for the targets of anger to experience. Third, other angry behaviors (refusing to cooperate, screaming, physical attack, denial of a benefit, etc.) often result in pain and other losses to the target.

As with the communicative function, there are reasons to hesitate when it comes to attributing the sanctioning function to anger. Anger is not always intended to impose costs. In addition, it is not always successful at doing so. Finally, it is often suppressed, in which case it cannot impose costs. Nevertheless, sanctioning counts as a function of anger for the same reasons that eliciting guilt does. Past instances of anger have had the effect of imposing sanctions and these past effects are part of the reason why anger exists today.

Our account here resembles the one Martha Nussbaum forwards in Anger and Forgiveness. In keeping with the cognitivist view of the emotions she has defended elsewhere, Nussbaum holds that anger involves a judgment. To be angry, she claims, is in part to think that someone has wronged us (or wronged someone or something we care about) (Nussbaum 2016, 17–18). Yet, like us, Nussbaum thinks there are other components to anger. Most notably, she sees anger as conceptually tied to the desire for revenge (2016, 17). She writes, “[T]he idea of payback or retribution—in some form, however subtle—is a conceptual part of anger” (2016, 15) and “a wish for payback is a conceptual part of anger” (2016, 22).

Nussbaum sees the link to payback as central to the philosophical tradition on anger. She cites Aristotle, the Stoics, Joseph Butler, and Adam Smith as prominent figures who endorse the connection between anger or resentment and the desire for revenge (2016, 22). She could also appeal to Charles Griswold (2007, 26), who describes anger as “a reactive as well as retributive passion that instinctively seeks to exact a
due measure of punishment.” But there have been dissenters to this popular view. Lactantius, for instance, claims that anger is not always connected with revenge. Sometimes it is aroused “in order that discipline be preserved, morals corrected, and license suppressed” (Lactantius 1965, 101). Judith Boss makes a similar point. She notes that victims of domestic abuse do not always possess a desire to “get even.” Often their anger is simply a matter of wanting the abuse to stop (Boss 1997, 236). Finally, Averill, to whom Nussbaum appeals for empirical support, is not in complete agreement with her. His work does show that anger is bound up with an impulse towards aggression, an instinctive desire to impose direct or indirect costs on the offender (Averill 1983, 1148). Over 80% of people in one of his studies reported an impulse towards verbal or symbolic aggression while angry; another 59% reported an impulse towards denying or removing some benefit from the offending party and 40% an impulse towards physical aggression. (1982, 193). Yet Averill points out that there is a variety of motives connected with anger’s aggressive impulse. One of them is revenge, as Nussbaum would have it. But others are more “constructively motivated” (1983, 1148). In fact, in one of Averill’s (1982, 177–78) studies, people appeal to self-defense or a desire to educate the offending party just as frequently as they appeal to vengeance in order to explain their angry aggression.

Thus, we agree with the spirit of Nussbaum’s position. A desire to impose (or have there be imposed) some kind of unwanted costs on the wrongdoer is at the core of moral anger. But, pace Nussbaum, we believe that these unwanted costs do not always aim at payback or revenge. Other motivations may also come into play here, such as self-defense, deterrence, rehabilitation, or education. To accommodate this broader focus, we prefer to speak of anger as having a sanctioning function rather than a retributive function.

Moral Conditions On the Sanctioning Function of Anger

Several conditions must obtain in order for the sanctioning function of anger to be morally justified. Some of them arise because of connections with the other functions of anger. Two are particularly important, and we will refer to them as the desert conditions for the sanctions imposed by anger (read Cogley 2013a). First, the sanctioning function of anger is justified only if anger’s core appraisal is correct. The reason for this condition is that a sanction is not a cost imposed for any old reason. A sanction is a cost imposed in response to a wrongful action. Therefore, it is deserved only if the action was in fact a wrong motivated by ill will or insufficient concern. Second, for similar reasons, the sanctioning function of anger is justified only if
the communicative functions of anger are felicitous. For a sanction is not just any negative response to a wrongful action. It is a response that imposes a cost aimed at expressing condemnation. Thus, sanctions are deserved only if condemning the action is appropriate—that is, only if the communicative functions are felicitous.

Although these two desert conditions are necessary for the sanctioning function to be morally justified, they are not sufficient. What else must obtain depends on the ultimate purpose of the sanctions. Here is where our disagreement with Nussbaum helps us. She identifies the purpose of anger’s sanctioning function as retribution. As a result, anger is morally justified on her view only insofar as payback is morally justified. Yet Nussbaum thinks payback is never morally justified. It involves either “magical thinking” or a “narcissistic tendency to focus on one’s own status” (Nussbaum 2016, 24, 54). Thus, she concludes that anger is inherently irrational. She writes, “[T]he payback idea is normatively problematic, and anger, therefore, with it” (2016, 15).

We are somewhat inclined to agree with Nussbaum about the irrationality of revenge. But, as stated before, we think that the sanctioning function of anger can have other purposes. These include self-defense, general deterrence, and the education or reform of the wrongdoer. We believe these purposes are sometimes both rationally justified and morally warranted. Thus, we do not accept Nussbaum’s notorious conclusion that anger is inevitably “stupid” (2016, 249; read Thomason 2017).

The Moral Status of Forgiveness

Although some scholars maintain that forgiveness is sometimes morally required, few propose that it is so in every situation (read Gamlund 2010; Holmgren 2012, 65). Most maintain that it is often or always elective (e.g., Allais 2008, 37; 2013, 637; Calhoun 1992, 81; Gamlund 2010, 543–45; Sussman 2005, 104; Zaragoza 2012, 617). It is up to the victim whether to forswear anger, and it is morally permissible for her to refuse. Others add that forgiveness is sometimes morally impermissible (Murphy 1990a, 17–18). Some offenses, especially particularly heinous ones, are literally unforgivable. It is morally inappropriate for us ever to forswear our anger toward them (Jankélévitch 2005, 156–66). A final virtue of our account is that it helps to explain this variability in the moral status of forgiveness.

On our view, it is possible—at least in principle—for forgiveness to be morally impermissible. If the core appraisal is accurate, the communicative functions are felicitious, the sanctioning function is deserved, and no other moral considerations tell against continued anger at the wrongdoer, then anger is morally required and
the action is unforgivable. The victim not only has good reasons to hold on to her anger but also lacks a reason to forswear it. Of course, it may well be that there are no such cases. Reasons that tell against being angry may always be present, and so determining whether the communicative and sanctioning functions are appropriate may always require balancing between various pro tanto considerations. If so, then forgiveness will always be at least permissible.

In addition, on our view, forgiveness is morally required in at least some cases. In particular, it is required if the wrongdoer has felt the fitting amount of guilt (i.e., given emotional uptake) and sincerely apologized (read Gamlund 2010, 553–55). Under such circumstances, there is no point to a continued negative emotional response toward the wrongdoer because of his wrongdoing. It is infelicitous to communicate the appraisal to the wrongdoer because he already believes and has internalized it. In addition, since the sanctioning function presupposes the communicative function, the sanction is also undeserved. Most importantly, since anger imposes unwanted costs on the wrongdoer, continuing with them when they do no good is a moral evil. Thus, the victim is required to forswear them.

Under most circumstances, however, things are much less clear (read G. S. Adams and Inesi 2016). How much guilt is fitting for any moral transgression cannot be measured precisely. Additionally, whether apologies and amends are sincere can be in doubt. These considerations concern the appraisal and communicative functions of anger. Things become more difficult still when we attend to all the reasons we may have for and against the sanctioning function of anger. As noted before, anger’s sanctions may serve a role in moral education—to motivate the wrongdoer to internalize the appraisal and feel guilty about what she has done. They may also aid in self- or other-defense. That is, they might motivate the wrongdoer to change her behavior regardless of whether she internalizes the appraisal. Finally, as Nussbaum thinks, anger’s sanctions may be retributive. They may serve to make the wrongdoer suffer in return for having made the victim suffer (Griswold 2007, 39; Murphy 1990b).

In addition to the variety of reasons that may support sanctions, there are a variety of reasons that may oppose them. First, the offense might be minor or far in the past, in which case we might stand to gain little or nothing by imposing anger’s sanctions. Thus, given the costs associated with imposing them, it might serve us better to move on (Emerick 2017; Enright and Song 2017). Second, anger’s sanctions might not be the most efficient way for us to achieve our goals. There might be readily available alternatives that are less costly and more effective at educating the wrongdoer and defending ourselves against him (Holmgren 2012, 66–75). Third,
the wrongdoer might be the sort of person who will make reparations on his own and is unlikely to reoffend. Thus, some of what we hope to accomplish with anger’s sanctions might happen anyway. To this degree, anger’s sanctions will be superfluous (Hieronymi 2001, 548).

The victim can thus have pro tanto reasons to forswear her anger with the wrongdoer as well as pro tanto reasons to hold on to it. Determining the right course of action will require balancing these reasons and adjudicating between them. This is not an easy task. Compounding matters is the fact that many of the reasons are scalar; they come in degrees of severity and seriousness. Additionally, they can be of qualitatively different kinds or sorts. For instance, the communicative function might be reasonable but the victim's continued anger might do significant collateral damage to his loved ones. It is unclear to us how detrimental continued anger must be to innocent bystanders in order to render inappropriate the project of eliciting guilt in the wrongdoer. It strikes us that minor discomfort to bystanders is probably not enough to render anger inappropriate in cases of major wrongdoings. In addition, it seems plausible that major discomfort to bystanders is probably sufficient to render anger inappropriate in cases of minor wrongdoings. But we find many vague cases between these two extremes.

In the end, it will often be unclear what the outcome of our calculations regarding anger should be. Reasonable people may come to different conclusions. (That does not mean anything goes, of course. Some weightings will be irrational.) We maintain that in such cases whether to forgive is an elective matter. The decision about how to weigh reasons for and against anger ought to be left to the person whose anger is in question. Typically, this will be the victim. But not always. As Pettigrove (2012, 33–39) points out, we sometimes get angry about—and then forgive—wrongs that do not directly harm us.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that focusing on the appraisal, communicative, and sanctioning functions of moral anger allows us to develop a new account of forgiveness. We do not believe our account ought to supplant all existing accounts of forgiveness. But we do maintain that it deserves to be considered as one promising approach among a number of other fruitful approaches to the topic because it has tremendous explanatory power. First, it can straightforwardly distinguish forgiveness from related phenomena, such as excuse and justification. Second, it perspicuously explains why forgiveness is reasonable when it is so. In particular, our account can explain
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Notes

1. For endorsements of the view that forgiving someone involves overcoming, letting go of, or for-swearing anger, read Allais (2008, 37, 39), Garrard and McNaughton (2003, 42–45; 2017, 96), Hieronymi (2001, 529–31), Holmgren (2012, 32), Murphy (1990a, 15, 20), Pettigrove (2012, 1–9), and Strawson (1962, 76). Bishop Joseph Butler is sometimes regarded as holding this view as well in his Fifteen Sermons (1900), but this interpretation has been disputed by Garcia (2011), Griswold (2007, 19–37), and Newberry (2001).

2. Philosophers almost always call the relevant emotion “resentment” or “indignation,” while psychologists prefer to talk of “anger.” We opt for the latter formulation because of the relevance of psychology to our argument, though we are dissatisfied with the connotations of all our terminological options. Some use “anger” in a way that allows the emotion to be directed at objects and the weather; “resentment” has the connotation of a long-lasting characterological disposition, and so on. We are not focusing on lexical matters, so if talk of anger sounds foreign we invite the reader to substitute whatever term seems more appropriate.

3. One interpretation of Strawson’s thought is that feeling emotions such as anger toward people’s conduct just is to make appraisals and that making emotional appraisals just is to attribute moral responsibility to someone (Wallace 1994).

4. For instance, according to Lazarus (1991, 223), anger involves viewing someone’s act as a “personal slight or demeaning offense.” Prinz and Nichols (2010, 122) maintain that anger involves seeing someone as “violat[ing] autonomy norms.” Shaver et al. (1987, 1078) hold that anger’s appraisal involves thinking that “the situation is illegitimate, wrong, unfair, contrary to what ought to be.” Finally, Averill (1983, 1150) asserts, “[A]nger is a value judgment. More than anything else, anger is an attribution of blame.”

5. For other discussions of the puzzle about whether forgiveness is elective, read Gamlund (2010) and Allais (2013).

6. Here and throughout the paper, we discuss simple, quotidian examples. We do so because such examples allow us to focus attention on the features of anger and forgiveness that are integral to our arguments. In addition, as will become clear, our central objection to Allais’s account of forgiveness is that it has trouble with quotidian examples. Of course, we do believe that our analysis of forgiveness would apply to more complicated and contentious examples. But making the case for this
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claim will have to wait for another paper.

7. On the issue of the accuracy or correctness of emotions, read D’Arms and Jacobson (2000).

8. Our strategy commits us to rejecting theories of emotion that treat emotions as nothing but ap-praisals or judgments. For instance, we must reject the idea that anger is nothing but the judgment that someone did wrong out of ill will or insufficient concern. But we are happy to accept this con-sequence. Theories that treat emotion as nothing but appraisals or judgments are falling out of fash-ion. As we discuss later, even Martha Nussbaum, who is sometimes seen as advocating such a theory, has argued in her recent work that anger does more than just appraise or judge (Nussbaum 2016, 17–18).

9. Here we expand on the typical view of guilt as a feeling associated with a negative judgment about a specific action undertaken by the self (H. B. Lewis 1971; M. Lewis 2018; Tangney and Dearing 2002; Tracy and Robins 2013).

10. At least, anger often goes almost completely unexpressed. It is difficult not to express one’s emo-tions on one’s face in some way or other. This is especially true when it comes to negative emotions, such as anger (Porter and ten Brinke 2008).

11. On this account, anger may have other communicative functions than eliciting guilt in the wrong-doer, such as getting the wrongdoer to make amends or publicly protesting the wrong (or wrongs of the same sort). These functions are interesting because they may be appropriate when eliciting guilt is not. We will largely leave them aside in what follows, but we think their investigation is ripe for future research.

12. Anger may also communicate to third parties—to people other than the wrongdoer or the victim—that the wrongdoer’s action has been appraised as wrongful. We leave this complexity aside in what follows.

13. Scholars tend to deny that the angry person sees the wrongdoer as having lost his or her moral status. For that would imply that the wrongdoer is no longer worthy of moral consideration or recognition. They sometimes put the point by saying that the angry person loses evaluative or esteem respect for the wrongdoer but not recognition respect (Allais 2008, 45, 53; Dillon 2001, 66–71; Holmgren 2012, 114).

14. For example, in Averill’s (1982, 193) classic study, although anger is almost always accompanied by an impulse towards aggression of some kind or other, including verbal or symbolic aggression, fewer than half of respondents acted on their aggressive impulses. Only 10% of respondents reported act-ing on their impulse to
physical aggression in particular.

15. It is common in the literature to draw distinctions between the various different goals that we might have for sanctioning or punishing a person. In particular, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation are all taken to be distinct ends. We will treat them as such in this paper.

16. In other words, we will treat sanctioning as an umbrella term that can be driven by a variety of different goals, including rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. Thus, we are not denying that retribution is one of the goals of anger’s sanctions. We are only denying that it is the only such goal.

17. Things get tricky here. The very same cost can either be a sanction or not be a sanction depending on the reason it is imposed. For example, both fines and fees require that money be paid. But only fines are sanctions, since only in that case is the money extracted because wrong was done (Boonin 2008, 22).

18. There may be exceptional cases where the sanctioning function does not depend on the accuracy of the appraisal or the felicity of the communicative function (read Calhoun 1989). We will leave aside these complications given the scope of this investigation into forgiveness for wrongdoing.

19. We presuppose here that there are only two functions of anger besides appraisal: communication and sanction. But we are in principle open to the possibility that other functions exist. Thus, strictly speaking, anger is required—and thus forgiveness is impermissible—only if these other functions are appropriate as well.

20. Here, again, we presuppose communicating and sanctioning are the only two functions of anger (besides appraisal), and thus anger has no point only if both of these functions are inappropriate. As noted before, however, we are in principle open to the possibility that other functions exist. Thus, strictly speaking, anger is impermissible and forgiveness is required only if these other functions are also inappropriate.
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