The “Death of the Author” in Hegel and Kierkegaard
On Berthold’s The Ethics of Authorship

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1. Introduction

Daniel Berthold’s The Ethics of Authorship: Communication, Seduction, and Death in Hegel and Kierkegaard is a well-written book, provocative in its theses, expansive in its scope, and creative in its execution. It prompts us to envision the relationship between G.W.F. Hegel and Søren Kierkegaard in novel ways and within a previously neglected framework, namely their approaches to communication, writing, and language. Nudging us beyond surface dissimilarities, it explores Hegel and Kierkegaard’s shared authorial project of helping readers progress toward selfhood, as well as their shared literary strategies for undertaking this project. All the while, it documents how subtle differences between the two thinkers’ conceptions of selfhood influence their attitudes regarding the relationship with others inherent in communication. Most intriguing, however, is a possible performative component to the book. It may well enact the very ethics of authorship it describes, thereby standing as a testament to the virtues of accommodating self-reference and avoiding self-forgetfulness.

Berthold focuses his attention on the “ethics of authorship,” i.e. the rules governing authors’ relationships with their readers (EA 3). His main thesis is that Hegel and Kierkegaard meet their obligations here by attempting to “die as authors” (EA 12; see also 9–11). As this location suggests, Berthold portrays Hegel and Kierkegaard as anticipating the concerns of postmodern thinkers from Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida to Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan (EA 134). In fact, Barthes’ comment concerning Stéphane Mallarmé in “The Death of the Author” more or less reflects Berthold’s reading of Hegel and Kierkegaard: “Mallarmé’s entire poetics consists in suppressing the author in the
interests of writing (which is, as will be seen, to restore the place of the reader)."

The phrase “the death of the author” picks out several different ideas for Berthold. On the one hand, it refers to an ethical ideal Hegel and Kierkegaard purportedly embrace. To wit, authors should abdicate their traditional privileged position as arbiters of their texts’ meaning. Instead, they ought to allow readers to determine this meaning for themselves. In so doing, they will help readers attain genuine selfhood and avoid a kind of inhuman madness, the madness of refusing to become a self.

On the other hand, “the death of the author” refers to two claims about language that Hegel and Kierkegaard allegedly endorse. First, the meaning of a text is not dictated by the author’s intentions but by the interpretations of readers. Indeed, no linguistic artifact possesses meaning apart from that given to it by readers. Second, language cannot express an author’s thoughts, feelings, or experiences. It negates, annuls, or “kills” this “inner reality” (EA 57). Thus, what we might think of as ordinary communication, the conveyance of ideas from one person to another, is impossible (EA 144f.).

The rest of this essay will investigate these aspects of the “death of the author” in more detail. Sections 2 and 3 will fill out Berthold’s account of Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s views on the topic. Sections 4 through 6 will discuss some potential challenges for Berthold’s interpretation. In keeping with the theme of this volume of the journal, the concerns raised will focus primarily on his treatment of Kierkegaard.

2. The “Death of the Author” as an Ethical Ideal

The point of departure for Berthold’s book is that Hegel and Kierkegaard believe authors have responsibilities to their readers. There exists, for them, an “ethics of authorship.” The primary guidelines of this ethics follow the dictates of common sense: Do not manipulate readers. Do not subjugate them to your own desires. Allow them to function as independent, self-determining agents.

Berthold also maintains that Hegel and Kierkegaard endorse the following corollary: Do not adopt a position of authority over your readers. This additional rule lacks the intuitive pull of the others, at least if construed as universal in scope. Consider a note from a parent, left for a son, telling him to make his bed. Or take an edict from a judge ordering a citizen to “cease and desist” in some illegal activity. In such and similar cases, the writer legitimately possesses authority over his or her intended audience. Exercising it via a printed medium is no transgression of justice or violation of ethical propriety.
Of course, taking up an authoritative stance can be morally dubious. It is so most obviously when it involves usurping power over others to which one is not entitled. Kierkegaard discusses this possibility in *The Book on Adler* and “The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle.” Apostles, he says, are permitted to tell others what to believe or which activities to undertake in the religious sphere. The reason is simple: God has granted them the right to do so. Those who have not received a divine mandate may not issue such instructions. They must allow others to make up their own minds concerning religious matters.

However, this type of situation does not capture what Berthold has in mind. He attributes to Hegel and Kierkegaard a more radical idea. To wit, authors should never serve as authorities regarding the meaning of their own words. They should never dictate to readers how to interpret their texts. Instead, they ought to write in a fashion that allows readers to decide upon an interpretation for themselves.

The rationale behind this idea is intriguing. Berthold claims that when authors fix the meaning of their sentences, they place the reader at their mercy. They subjugate the reader to their wills. How so? Well, if readers wish to know what a text means, they must submit to the authority of the author (EA 138). They must sacrifice their autonomy to the God of the author’s voice, to use Barthes’ words. To avoid this undesirable state of affairs, the author must allow readers to construct the meaning of the text for themselves (EA 61). Preserving readers’ independence here requires the author to hide his or her intentions from view (EA 61, 135, 137). In sum, authors have a duty to enact their disappearance or “deaths” (EA 61, 80–1, 135, 142).

According to Berthold, Kierkegaard’s indirect manner of communication (EA 26–8, 30, 59–60, 140), and his use of pseudonyms in particular (EA 28, 65, 132), illustrate how to uphold this ethical requirement. In his pseudonymous writings, Kierkegaard speaks to us from behind the masks of unknown figures with enigmatic personalities. These characters may be intent upon irony or edification, tell jokes or offer sage advice. We cannot tell which. Thus we are cut free from the stable moorings of authorial guidance. We must rely on our own devices when deciding upon the meaning of the texts we encounter. Yet, Berthold points out, precisely because we must fend for ourselves now, we have become autonomous. We have been liberated from the tyranny of the author (EA 30–1, 59–61). In sum, “the disappearance of the author [behind the masks of pseudonymity] is the ethical act of indirect communication by which the reader comes face to face with her own freedom and responsibility for constructing a meaning of her own” (EA 61).

Strikingly, Berthold claims that Hegel too practices indirect communication (EA 4–5, 31, 33–5, 38, 162). Of course, it is tempting to take
the opposite view, to see Hegel as the self-proclaimed “Wise Man” who
directly imparts “Absolute Knowledge” to his readers (EA 96, 160).
Several twentieth-century French critics accuse Hegel of subjecting
readers to his authority in this very fashion (EA 12, 160–1, 176). But
Berthold rejects their interpretation. He maintains that Hegel eschews
ordinary assertions (EA 11, 33–4, 90–3, 166) and refuses to provide
assurances as to the truth of what he says (EA 166). Moreover, the so-
called “Absolute Knowledge” he provides “has no content of its own”
(EA 176). It does not encompass his final answers, insights, or wisdom
(EA 177). The appearance of such is a mirage. Hegel writes so that the
“meanings [of his statements] are never ‘at rest’ but perpetually ‘dis-
solve and pass over’ into new configurations” (EA 166; see also 124). In
the end, his words say nothing but what we make of them (EA 93).
Thus we must tell our own story about the content of “Absolute
Knowledge” (EA 11, 32, 93, 176, 178).

3. The “Death of the Author” as a Set of Claims about
Language

I said earlier that Berthold also employs the phrase “the death of the
author” to pick out two positions Hegel and Kierkegaard allegedly hold
regarding the nature of language. The philosophical motivations for
these views remain obscure throughout Berthold’s book. Nevertheless,
we can articulate the views themselves in a fairly straightforward fash-
ion.

First, the author is dead for Hegel and Kierkegaard in the sense that
authorial intentions do not fix the meaning of a text. Although it has its
detractors, this point is not inordinately controversial. Even John
Searle, set up by Berthold as the antipode to Hegel and Kierkegaard
(EA 129), accepts that the meaning of a sentence does not depend on
the intentions of the speaker who uttered it. However, Berthold
attributes two additional claims to Hegel and Kierkegaard. They sup-
posedly believe that sentential meaning is not dictated by conventional
semantic and syntactic rules. Rather, it is determined by the individual
reader’s interpretation, which need not follow any such rules. As Berthold
puts it, “the site of meaning is shifted onto the reader’s response” (EA 62;
see also 19, 170). These views do put Hegel and Kierkegaard at odds
with Searle.

Several consequences of this position become refrains in The Ethics
of Authorship. Berthold states in a number of places that Hegel and
Kierkegaard deny that authors have privileged access to the meaning
of their texts (EA 18–9, 139, 166). On the contrary, authors understand
their texts no better than readers. Berthold also repeatedly asserts
that, for Hegel and Kierkegaard, “language is more honest than intention” (EA 16–24, 33). This cryptic phrase refers to the Derridean notion that sentences always mean something more and something other than what their authors intended (EA 33). The underlying idea here is that the process of interpretation continues ad infinitum. Since readers’ interpretations determine the meaning of a sentence, each new interpretation imbues the sentence with new meaning. These new meanings quickly outstrip whatever the author or speaker had in mind.

Second, Berthold maintains that the author is dead for Hegel and Kierkegaard in the sense that readers can never discover an author’s intentions (EA 17–9, 24). The primary reason they cannot do so is that language cannot capture the contents of an author’s mind (EA 17, 57, 145, 170). This inner world—or inner reality, as Berthold sometimes calls it—is ineffable (EA 26–7). In fact, language destroys it: “Like Kierkegaard, Hegel understands language as involving a certain ‘annulment of reality,’ or a ‘destruction of reality,’ as Sartre put it to Beauvoir. In particular, language entails the negation of the private reality of the speaker” (EA 57). Consequently, an unbridgeable chasm exists between author and reader (EA 12, 27, 37, 53, 67, 139, 143, 176). Communication as we ordinarily understand it is impossible (EA 144).

4. Exegetical Challenges

Berthold’s ability to trace the manifold meanings and implications of “the death of the author” in Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s thought is impressive. In this respect alone, his work constitutes an important addition to the growing tradition of reading both figures as anticipating postmodern concerns. Nevertheless, I wish to raise a series of challenges to his account. I will begin with ones that are exegetical in nature.

First, Berthold frequently cites a pair of passages that have become pillars of support for postmodern readings of Kierkegaard. Both passages come from Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Both imply that authors are not the best interpreters of their own texts:

I am pleased that the pseudonymous authors . . . have themselves not said anything or misused a preface to take an official position on the production, as if in a purely legal sense an author were the best interpreter of his own words.10

Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I have no opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning except as a reader.11

These selections provide strong evidence in favor of Berthold’s position. However, they are counterbalanced by others. For example, in a discussion of John 12:32 located in Practice in Christianity, we read:
How the sacred words just read are to be understood we have shown from various sides, not as if their meaning has thereby become different, no, but we have tried to come from various sides to one and the same meaning of the words. Nor will anyone be likely to deny to us that this is the right meaning of the words. But to confirm this we shall not fail to cite the person who not only as the author of these words is the best interpreter of his own words but by his divine authority calls for silence and cuts off all further interpretation if it does not lead to the same interpretation: the Apostle John.12

We might hesitate to place great weight on these lines because they concern scripture, always a special case for Kierkegaard. Yet, there exists another passage that does not suffer from this difficulty. In the “Preface” to Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, Kierkegaard provides instructions concerning how readers should approach the book. Specifically, he describes three attitudes (“admiration,” “criticism,” and “recognition”) that will result in misunderstanding if adopted.13 These comments suggest that Kierkegaard does see himself as an authority when it comes to the interpretation of his writings.

Any advocate of Berthold’s view must wrestle with Kierkegaard’s inconsistency on this point. Given that Practice in Christianity (1851) occurs later than Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), a developmental view is tempting. Kierkegaard may (wrongly) have come to abandon his early position that authors are not the best interpreters of their works. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not viable. Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions (1845) was published a year before Postscript. In addition, Kierkegaard reiterates the claim that he has no privileged position regarding the meaning of his pseudonymous writings as late as On My Work as an Author (1851).14 A more plausible interpretation is that Kierkegaard draws a distinction between different types of texts. For some (perhaps signed works and scripture), authors are the best interpreters of their own words; for others (perhaps pseudonymous writings), they are not. Of course, accepting this alternative hypothesis would require Berthold to alter his view.

Second, Berthold’s claim that mental content is ineffable for Kierkegaard heavily relies on a brief passage from the posthumously published Johannes Climacus, or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est.15 The passage states that language cannot express “immediacy [Umiddelbarheid].” The problem is that Kierkegaard does not use “immediacy [Umiddelbarhed]” to refer to the entirety of the mental realm. This is particularly true in the case of Johannes Climacus, where it refers merely to the contents of perceptual experience. For example, in one draft of the book—and all we have are drafts—we read:
This could be expressed, [Johannes Climacus] thought, by saying that the immediate [Umiddelbart] is reality, language is ideality, since by speaking I produce the contradiction. When I seek to express sense perception [Sandsningen] in this way, the contradiction is present, for what I say is something different from what I want to say.16

In another draft, Kierkegaard writes: “Immediacy [Umiddelbarheden] does not allow itself to be expressed at all.”17 He then proceeds to talk about the impossibility of expressing the content of sense perception: “Thus as soon as I want to express immediacy in language, contradiction is present, for language is ideal. As long as I am defined as merely a sensory being, everything is true; as soon as I want to express sensation [Sandsningen], contradiction is present.”18

Berthold seems aware of the issue I raise. In fact, his discussion of expressing immediacy focuses on the difficulties with conveying the content of sensory experience (EA 17–8). However, if immediacy refers only to the content of sensory experience, the ineffability of immediacy does not entail the incommunicability of all mental content. Kierkegaard may hold the latter position, but one cannot rightly defend the claim that he does based on the aforementioned passages from Johannes Climacus.19

Third, Berthold’s interpretation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of language obliterates the distinction drawn in Concluding Unscientific Postscript between accidental and essential secrets.20 Accidental secrets refer to that which a person could share but decides to keep private. Essential secrets refer to that which a person cannot make public even in principle. As we have seen, on Berthold’s account, Kierkegaard believes that a person can never share his or her thoughts with others. Common sense communication, the meeting of minds, is impossible. Consequently, there can be no accidental secrets, only essential ones. This implication does not reflect what we read in Kierkegaard’s text. For the text explicitly states that there can be accidental secrets; some mental content can be communicated, at least in principle.21

Fourth, Berthold’s position undermines another important distinction Kierkegaard draws, namely the one between direct and indirect communication. These terms are notoriously obscure. But, for the purposes of argument, we can follow Berthold’s interpretation. He maintains that indirect communication refers to writing in which the author disappears so that readers are left to reconstruct the meaning of the text for themselves (EA 59–61). By contrast, direct communication refers to writing in which the author sets forth the meaning of his or her text in an authoritative fashion (EA 4, 83). The problem is that, on Berthold’s account of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of language, authors
cannot fix the meaning of their texts. Readers always have to determine for themselves the meaning of the words they encounter. In fact, words have no meaning besides that which readers give them. Therefore, all interactions between authors and readers fall under the description Berthold supplies for indirect communication. In other words, whether he admits it or not, all communication is indirect on his view. This implication contradicts the suggestion in Postscript that ordinary communication is direct. It also conflicts with Kierkegaard’s claim that he sometimes employs direct communication. Finally, it cuts against the grain of Berthold’s own suggestion that Kierkegaard sought to develop an indirect style of writing that opposed the direct style used by his contemporaries (EA 4).

5. First Conceptual Challenge

I will raise two broadly conceptual challenges to Berthold’s interpretation of Hegel and Kierkegaard. The first concerns the relationship between their philosophy of language and their ethics of authorship. Berthold’s official position is that the former drives the latter. Hegel and Kierkegaard’s views about language dictate which writing styles they believe they should use. In particular, they think they should employ styles that enable them to relate to readers in a nonauthoritarian fashion. For example, we read in the introduction to The Ethics of Authorship:

> Both [Hegel and Kierkegaard] held views of language that led them to develop styles of writing that sought a nonauthoritarian relation to the reader (Kierkegaard’s depiction of Hegel as a quintessentially autocratic author notwithstanding), and the ethics of communication in each case circles around the problem of how to achieve this: how to author a text that does not reduce the reader to a mere pre-text, or a representation, or sign of the author’s signification. (EA 10; emphasis added)

However, this position seems untenable. On Berthold’s account, Hegel and Kierkegaard’s philosophy of language says that authors cannot determine the meaning of their texts. Meaning is always determined by readers. Thus, no matter how they write, it is impossible for authors to adopt an authoritative stance over their readers with regard to the meaning of their texts. Since adhering to the ethics of authorship is about avoiding this particular kind of authoritative stance (EA 10), it follows that all writing styles fall within ethical bounds. Therefore, far from motivating the ethical project of finding nonauthoritarian writing styles, Hegel and Kierkegaard’s philosophy of language renders it superfluous.
A serious problem for Berthold’s book arises at this point. Its stated goal is to investigate which writing styles allow a person to live up to the ethics of authorship: “This is a book about the ethics of authorship. It explores different conceptualizations of the author’s responsibilities to the reader. But it also engages the question of which styles of authorship allow for these responsibilities to be met” (EA 7). Berthold paints both Hegel and Kierkegaard as intensely preoccupied with this project. Indeed, one of his main theses is that, contrary to appearance, Hegel is just as concerned about this project as Kierkegaard:

Part of the aim of this book is to complicate this picture of Hegel so as to allow him to emerge, as from behind an eclipse, as an author deeply concerned with the ethics of authorship . . . (EA 4)

By realigning the kaleidoscopic images of Hegel and Kierkegaard, Hegel emerges as a much more subtle practitioner of style than in Kierkegaard’s representation of him—indeed as a practitioner whose style is in the service of an ambitious reconceptualization of the ethics of authorship . . . (EA 6)

Although it is true in one sense that the Hegelian philosophy lacks an ethics, I argue that in a deeper sense Hegel is as concerned with the ethics of authorship as is Kierkegaard. (EA 9)

To support his position, Berthold develops a radical story about Hegel’s grammar of assertion that attempts to recast how we think about the statements set forth in Hegel’s works. Yet, given what I have said, it is unclear why Berthold needs to tell such a story. If Hegel’s philosophy of language entails that all writing styles conform to the requirements of his ethics of authorship, then he does not have to construct a novel method of philosophical writing in order to live up to these requirements. Consequently, a significant part of Berthold’s book appears unmotivated.

6. Second Conceptual Challenge

There is another, related problem that afflicts Berthold’s discussion of Hegel and Kierkegaard’s ethics of authorship. On the one hand, Berthold purports to have uncovered their actual ethics of authorship, the views on the topic they in fact hold. Moreover, he writes as if having done so on the basis of a close reading of their works. On the other hand, Berthold describes their ethics of authorship as involving a refusal to assign meanings to their sentences (EA 134f.). He declares that, for Kierkegaard, “each pseudonymous work ends in meaninglessness” (EA 80); as a group, they “elude and evade literal meaning” (EA 80). Similarly, he says that “the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy is a work
of irony” (EA 92; see also 33) in which we encounter what Lacan calls “a perpetual deferral of meaning” (EA 92f.; see also 33f.). These two points stand in tension, each seeming to require the sacrifice of the other. Let me explain.

First, if Hegel and Kierkegaard had done what Berthold says, then all connection between their thoughts and their words would be severed. Consequently, reading their texts could not lead to a discovery of their views. Any commentary on their work would be the commentator’s own creation. It would be his or her subjective interpretation of a series of Rorschach inkblot tests, to use Berthold’s metaphor (EA 5). Others might see what the commentator did. However, Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s writings would not express what they saw any more than Rorschach ink blots represent the images people perceive in them. Thus, no commentary would teach us about Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s views. The Ethics of Authorship would be no exception. As such, it would fail to do what it purports to do. It would not disclose Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s actual ethics of authorship.

Second, if Berthold’s book did reveal Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s views, then these latter would have failed to achieve their goals. For, according to Berthold, they sought to conceal what they believed. They endeavored to prevent readers from discovering what they thought. Yet, The Ethics of Authorship would stand as a testament to the fact that astute readers could uncover their secrets after all.

In sum, we must choose. We can be charitable either toward Hegel and Kierkegaard or toward Berthold. We can maintain either that Hegel and Kierkegaard succeeded in their authorial projects or that Berthold did.

It is conceivable that the existence of this dilemma is intentional. Berthold may have constructed his book so as to allow readers to decide how to construe his book. He may have engaged in the very practice of indirect communication he describes. This interpretation is suggested by the fact that Berthold appears partial to the ethics of authorship he attributes to Hegel and Kierkegaard. For instance, in the acknowledgments at the outset of the book, he discusses his relationship with his students at the Eastern Correctional Facility. He says that these inmates have “no need for an author who will only further discipline [them] into submission or even who will give only the gift of knowledge” (EA xi–ii). They require “the gift of liberation,” the opportunity to discover their own voices. And they receive this gift upon encountering texts in which the meaning is determined by their own responses (EA xii). It would not surprise if Berthold sought to write such a text. However, I leave it to other readers of The Ethics of Authorship to determine whether he has done so.
NOTES


8. At one point, Berthold says that Hegel “never relinquishes the idea of shared meanings” (35). He also maintains that, for Hegel, the destruction of the speaker’s “inner reality” is simultaneously a rebirth “into the communal space of being-with-others” (57). Such statements suggest that ordinary communication is possible after all. It is unclear how Berthold reconciles this suggestion with the rest of his account of Hegel’s philosophy of language.

9. Postmodern interpretations of Kierkegaard in particular have become common. See, for example, Peter Fenves, Chatter: Language and History in Kierkegaard (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993); Geoffrey A. Hale, Kierkegaard and the Ends of Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Elsebet Jegstrup, ed., The New Kierkegaard (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Louis Mackey, Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1986); Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993); Michael Strawser, Both / And: Reading Kierkegaard from Irony to Edification (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997).
10. Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, vol. 1, p. 252. See EA 61, 155, 166; Berthold cites the older translation by Swenson and Lowrie.


18. Ibid.


21. Ibid.


For instance, he claims to present what Hegel and Kierkegaard intend to do in carrying out their ethics of authorship, EA 35, 80.